Transparium

Validated long‑lived datasheets
for precision industries

Using two technologies: digital product passports, and blockchains.

app.transparium.com  ·  Figures dated August 2026  ·  S speaker notes  ·  ? shortcuts

The problem

Three problems, one root cause

Precision manufacturing runs on documents — and the documents are the weakest part of the system.

01 · Supply chain tracking
Where a part came from, and through whose hands.
Today — paper certificates and emailed PDFs, re-keyed into each company's own system.
02 · Authenticity validation
Whether the document is genuine, and issued by who it says.
Today — telephone the issuing organisation and wait. So it is almost never done.
03 · Datasheet preservation
Whether the specification is still readable, and still unaltered.
Today — a PDF on a shared drive, retained 5–10 years for a part that flies for 25–40.
TRANSPARIUM/THE PROBLEMTHREE PROBLEMS

Technology one

A passport the owner actually holds

A Digital Product Passport carries a certificate of ownership and authenticity that any counterparty can validate — built to the EU DPP standards, so it is a recognised record rather than a private file.

THE PART Serialised item or a certified lot DIGITAL PRODUCT PASSPORT Certificate of ownership and authenticity Issuer · item · history HELD IN A DIGITAL WALLET On a phone, at goods-in In the company database or ERP In the factory quality system Solves problems 01 and 02 — the passport travels with the part, and anyone can check who issued it.
TRANSPARIUM/THE SOLUTIONDIGITAL PRODUCT PASSPORT

Technology two

A datasheet that outlives the company that wrote it

The specification is committed to a blockchain. The passport carries only the reference — so the record stays small, and the document stays provably unaltered.

THE SPECIFICATION Technical datasheet material, process, tolerances COMMITTED TO A BLOCKCHAIN Permanent and tamper-evident No custodian to trust, and no company that can quietly revise it sha256:9f2c4a…e71b STORED IN THE PASSPORT Just the reference one line, not a 240 KB file Solves problem 03 — one specification, committed once, referenced by every part built to it.
TRANSPARIUM/THE SOLUTIONBLOCKCHAIN PRESERVATION

The two together

The passport says who. The chain says what.

Neither technology is sufficient alone. A passport with no anchored specification is a claim; an anchored specification with no passport is a file nobody can attribute.

Digital Product Passport
Ownership, authenticity and issuer identity — held by the owner, validated by anyone, standardised across companies that share no systems.
Blockchain
The specification itself — permanent, tamper-evident, and readable long after the issuing company, its file formats and its vendors have gone.
Together
A part that carries its own proof: who made it, who owns it, and exactly what it was built to — verifiable by a stranger, for the whole service life of the part.
TRANSPARIUM/THE SOLUTIONCOMBINED

Before the detail

Three things we are not going to claim

Not a compliance deadline
Aviation parts are under no EU Digital Product Passport obligation today, and are on no published delegated-act timeline to 2030.
Not a new idea
Blockchain-anchored passports already ship in luxury, batteries and polymers. EASA itself assessed blockchain for approved parts in the VIRTUA project, completed 2024.
Not a fix for bad data
A ledger cannot make a false record true. It makes the origin of a record attributable, and later alteration detectable.
What is actually driving this
Two problems manufacturers already have and already pay for — provenance they cannot prove, and technical records that expire decades before the part does.
And what changed five weeks ago
The EU's DPP technical standards were cited in the Official Journal on 15 July 2026, and the EU DPP Registry went live on 20 July 2026. The rulebook now exists.
TRANSPARIUM/GROUND RULESWHAT WE DO NOT CLAIM
SECTION 01

The problem, in detail

What provenance failure actually costs, and why the technical record expires long before the part does.

The problem · provenance

Sixty thousand parts, ninety-five forged documents

Between January 2019 and July 2023, AOG Technics sold over 60,000 engine parts into the CFM56 supply chain with forged Authorised Release Certificates — one man in a home office in Surrey, doctoring genuine certificates on his own computer.

He was caught because an engineer at TAP Air Portugal saw a part that looked worn while its paperwork said new, and phoned Safran.

The uncomfortable detail
In every confirmed example, the organisation named on the certificate confirmed on request that the form was not theirs. Verification was always available — nobody does it routinely, because it costs an email and a wait.
60,000+
Parts sold with forged release certificates, 2019–2023
95
Falsified documents behind them, across 61 CFM56 part numbers
126 / 22,600
Engines with falsely documented parts, against the in-service fleet — under 1%
CFM statement, 4 Oct 2023
1
Engineer whose scepticism unravelled four years of it

Say the whole truth: the FAA found no unsafe condition warranting an Airworthiness Directive (SAIB 2023-15). Nobody died. The director was jailed for 4 years 8 months in February 2026. The cost was £39.3m and an industry-wide records audit — a systemic and economic failure, not a crash.

TRANSPARIUM/THE PROBLEMAOG TECHNICS · 2019–2023

The problem · where the gap actually is

Not one life-limited part was involved

CFM's audit found the fraud lived entirely in bolts, nuts, washers, dampers, seals and bushings — the batch-released commodity hardware nobody serialises.

Serialised, life-limited parts
Already carry back-to-birth traceability, individual records and a disc-level paper trail worth as much as the disc. Zero fraudulent documents found.
Non-serialised commodity hardware
One certificate per part number, per lot. High volume, low unit value, minimal scrutiny. This is where all of it happened.
The existing controls work where the parts are expensive enough to justify them. The gap is precisely where the economics of per-item control have never made sense.
And it is not hypothetical hardware. Partnair Flight 394 broke up off the Danish coast in September 1989 when three of the four counterfeit bolts holding the vertical fin failed. 55 dead. A fastener — not a rotating part. It is much of why the FAA created its unapproved-parts programme.

This is why the worked example later in this deck is a fastener lot and not a turbine disc. The disc is already solved. The screw is not.

TRANSPARIUM/THE PROBLEMTHE COMMODITY GAP

The problem · how trust propagates

Every check re-reads the same document

01 · MILL Raw material material cert 02 · OEM Manufacture EASA Form 1 03 · DISTRIBUTOR Stock & split lot broken up 04 · BROKER Docs forged paper only 05 · MRO Part fitted accepts the tag 06 · IN SERVICE On wing for 20–30 years TRUST BREAKS HERE — EVERY LINK DOWNSTREAM INHERITS IT Every downstream check re-reads the same document. Nothing in the chain independently confirms that the part is what the paper says it is.
TRANSPARIUM/THE PROBLEMTHE TRACE CHAIN

The problem · longevity

The record expires before the part does

5 / 10 yrs
Record retention required of a production approval holder — 10 for critical components
14 CFR 21.137(o) · 45.15(c)
25–40 yrs
Service life of the airframe that part is fitted to. Individual A320s exceed 35 years.
Typical retirement age
2–8×
Times over the mandated manufacturing record can expire within the life of the article it describes
Arithmetic on the two figures left
What a gap costs
For a life-limited part, an unexplained break in back-to-birth records means remaining life cannot be substantiated — so the part is treated as having zero life remaining. A CFM56 high-pressure turbine disc runs around $300,000. It is mechanically sound and it is scrap.
And on the asset
Practitioners in the records-digitisation market put the resale-value loss from degraded records at 20–40%. Treat that as an industry rule of thumb — it comes from vendors selling digitisation, not audited transaction data. The 43.10 consequence above is the rigorous version.
TRANSPARIUM/THE PROBLEMDATA LONGEVITY

The problem · the obvious objection

"Spec 2000 Chapter 16 already solved this"

It largely did, on paper. Chapter 16 defines a PKI-signed, tamper-evident electronic release certificate — accepted by the FAA, EASA and Transport Canada — where each eForm references the one before it, building a verifiable chain of custody.

Airbus, Boeing, GE, Pratt & Whitney and Rolls-Royce were on the project team. It has existed since the mid-2000s.

AOG Technics happened anyway. So the interesting question is not what the standard specifies — it is why the check still doesn't happen.
Why the gap persists
It is a document exchange between trading partners. Verification runs point-to-point: to check a certificate, you contact the issuer and wait. There is no surface a receiving inspector can query in ten seconds without a prior relationship, an account, or a support ticket.
What actually has to change
Make the check cost nothing and require nobody's cooperation. If confirming a part's origin is a scan rather than an email thread, it gets done at every receiving inspection instead of after an engineer gets suspicious.
TRANSPARIUM/THE PROBLEMWHY IT PERSISTS
SECTION 02

Digital Product Passports, without the hand-waving

What the standards actually require, what is genuinely mandated for you today, and where a ledger earns its place.

The approach · regulatory reality

There is no aviation DPP mandate. Here is what is true instead.

What we will not claim
The Ecodesign Regulation (EU) 2024/1781 has been in force since July 2024, but it is a framework — obligations switch on product group by product group. Its 2025–2030 working plan names six: iron & steel, aluminium, textiles, tyres, furniture, mattresses. Aviation parts appear in none of them, and no preparatory study has been launched.
But you are not exempt either
The exclusion list covers food, medicines, living organisms and road vehicles. Aircraft parts are not on it. ESPR reaches components and intermediate products, and does not distinguish B2B from B2C.
What is actually coming at you — inbound
Iron & steel is the first delegated act, consultation closed August 2026, indicative adoption Q4 2026. Aluminium follows in 2027. With the usual 18-month transition, your metal suppliers start issuing passports at you around 2028. That is a data-ingestion problem before it is ever an issuing problem.
And the infrastructure is already live
The EU DPP Registry went live 20 July 2026 — four weeks before this deck. The battery passport becomes the first legally binding DPP on 18 February 2027. Whatever breaks then is what every later sector inherits.

Indicative dates. Commission planning dates, not legal deadlines, and they have slipped before.

TRANSPARIUM/THE APPROACHREGULATORY REALITY

The approach · the standards

The technical rulebook is settled

CEN/CENELEC JTC 24 delivered eight EN standards under mandate M/604. Six were cited in the Official Journal on 15 July 2026 and carry presumption of conformity — and they describe, almost exactly, the problem this deck opened with.

StandardCoversWhy it matters to a parts manufacturer
EN 18219 Unique identifiers Identity at model, batch or item level — batch is explicitly permitted
EN 18220 Data carriers QR, Data Matrix, NFC and RFID — Data Matrix named for direct part marking
EN 18221 Storage, archiving, persistence The multi-decade retention problem, as a standards requirement
EN 18239 Access rights, security, confidentiality Exists because commercially sensitive supply-chain data is the hard part
EN 18246 Data authentication and integrity Whether a passport can be trusted not to have been altered
Aviation is ahead here, not behind. Data Matrix part marking has been standard since Boeing and Airbus committed to ATA Spec 2000 Chapter 9 in 2001. The carrier layer is already built.
The Commission is technology-neutral — blockchain included. Anyone leading a DPP pitch with a ledger rather than conformance to these standards is selling you the wrong thing.
TRANSPARIUM/THE APPROACHEN 1821x / 1822x / 1824x

The approach · architecture

What goes on a chain, and what must not

PHYSICAL ON‑CHAIN OFF‑CHAIN THE PART Screw · S/N 000417 P/N HST12-8-6 · lot 24B laser-marked Data Matrix SCAN SMART CONTRACT · ONE PER PART PROGRAMME 0x7Ac4…19bE CERTIFICATE · ONE PER ITEM item_name HST12-8-6/000417 value sha256:9f2c4a…e71b PUBLIC READER · NO LOGIN app.transparium.com/reader ?address=0x7Ac4…19bE &item=HST12-8-6/000417 Reads the chain, not our database. HASH RESOLVES CONTENT STORE · THE DOCUMENT Technical data sheet, 240 KB. Addressed by its own hash, not a filename. WHY THIS SPLIT MATTERS Change one byte and the hash stops matching. Tampering is detectable, forever.
TRANSPARIUM/THE APPROACHTHE BINDING

The approach · the honest boundary

Immutability is not veracity

A ledger guarantees a record was not altered after it was written. It guarantees nothing about whether the record was true when written. AOG Technics did not tamper with anyone's records — it invented its own, from scratch, and they were internally consistent.

A tamper-proof forgery is still a forgery. Any pitch that stops at "immutable" has not addressed the failure it claims to fix.

So the load-bearing part is identity
The question a receiving inspector needs answered is not has this record been altered — it is did the approved organisation named on it actually write it.

That is why issuer verification is not a badge on this platform. It is the product.
Who wrote it
A wallet tied to a legal entity through offline identity checks, with the legal name written on-chain
When
A block timestamp nobody can backdate, including us
Unchanged since
A content hash anyone can recompute from any copy of the document
TRANSPARIUM/THE APPROACHIMMUTABILITY ≠ VERACITY
SECTION 03

Using it on a real part programme

Four steps, and what each one actually writes. Nothing here is a mock-up — this is the shipped product.

How to use it · overview

Four steps from account to scannable part

STEP 01
Create the account
An Ethereum wallet is created for your organisation on first login. You never handle a seed phrase; the key is encrypted at rest with AWS KMS.
wallet auto-provisioned
STEP 02
Deploy one contract per programme
Give it a name a person would recognise — HST12 Fastener Programme. A smart contract is deployed and you get its address immediately.
POST /api/contracts/
STEP 03
Issue a certificate per item
One certificate per serial number. Each yields a public URL and a downloadable SVG QR code for the part marking.
POST …/certificates/
STEP 04
Verify the issuer, then share
Offline identity checks put your legal name on-chain, so a third party can confirm who issued the passport without asking us.
POST …/verify/

The same four steps are what a university uses for degrees. What makes it an aviation DPP is the content of the certificate and the identity of the issuer — not a different product.

TRANSPARIUM/HOW TO USEAVIATION PARTS · DPP

How to use it · step 02

One contract per part programme

The contract is the container. Everything issued under it inherits its issuer identity, its access rules and its verification status — so the boundary you draw here is the boundary a customer sees.

  • Per programme, not per part. A contract holding the whole HST12 fastener family keeps one verified identity across every lot.
  • Per customer, if you need separation. Two contracts means an airline auditing its own parts never sees another operator's serials.
  • Deployment is a one-off. Adding the ten-thousandth certificate does not redeploy anything.
What gets written
A contract deployed from the current template, which carries contract-level privileges — who may create items — and per-item authorisation — who may modify one specific certificate.
Template versioning is handled. Contracts deployed before per-item authorisation existed keep working: the deploy operation stores its own source, so every address resolves back to the template it came from and is read with that version's function names.
TRANSPARIUM/HOW TO USESTEP 02 · CONTRACT

How to use it · step 03

What a certificate carries

A certificate is a name and a value. The name is how you find it; the value is what you are attesting. Both go on-chain.

The name — your identifier, not ours
HST12-8-6/000417
Part number and serial, exactly as it is marked on the item. Up to 256 characters, so a full ATA-style identifier fits.
The value — the attestation
Small payloads go on-chain directly. Anything substantial is stored as sha256:… — the hash on-chain, the document in the content store.
A worked certificate value
// what you attest, on-chain
part_number   "HST12-8-6"
serial        "000417"
lot           "24B"
material      "Ti-6Al-4V"
spec_sheet    "sha256:9f2c4a…e71b"
release_ref   "EASA-F1-2026-04471"
manufactured  "2026-03-11"

Deliberately not on-chain: anything personal, anything a customer could demand be erased, and the Form 1 PDF itself. Those live in the content store, committed to by hash. That split is what keeps the design compatible with a right-to-erasure request.

TRANSPARIUM/HOW TO USESTEP 03 · CERTIFICATE

How to use it · the carrier

What the mark on the part resolves to

Every certificate produces a URL and an SVG QR code. The SVG matters: it scales to a 3 mm laser mark without resampling.

// the short form — what goes under a Data Matrix or QR on the part
https://app.transparium.com/reader?address=0x7Ac4…19bE&item=HST12-8-6/000417

// the long form — carries the read ABI, so it resolves without our lookup
https://app.transparium.com/reader?address=0x7Ac4…19bE&abi=%5B%7B%22name%22…&params=HST12-8-6/000417
No login
The reader is public. A mechanic on a stand scans it and gets an answer — no account, no app install, no portal invitation.
Reads the chain
The page resolves the value from the contract itself, not from a database we could quietly edit.
Survives us
The address and item name are enough to read the record from any Ethereum node, with any client, if Transparium is not there.
TRANSPARIUM/HOW TO USETHE DATA CARRIER

How to use it · step 04

Proving the issuer is who they claim

A tamper-proof record issued by an anonymous wallet proves nothing. The identity layer is what turns it into evidence.

  • Offline identity checks. You request verification; we check your company against real documents, off-chain, the way any KYC process works.
  • Your legal name goes on-chain. Not into our database — into a contract variable, readable from any node.
  • Third parties verify without us. A public page and a public endpoint publish where those names live, so an auditor can check your contract's legal owner independently.
Why a storage variable, not an event log
Event logs are cheaper, but they live in transaction receipts — which nodes are permitted to stop serving as Ethereum's history-expiry work lands. A contract storage variable lives in the state every node must carry to validate the next block. Identity records are pinned to storage for exactly this reason.
Read this as a limit, not a feature list. Verification says this contract belongs to this legal entity. It does not say the part is airworthy. Airworthiness is your Form 1 and your quality system; this makes the claim attributable and tamper-evident.
TRANSPARIUM/HOW TO USESTEP 04 · ISSUER IDENTITY

How to use it · control

Who is allowed to change what

"Active verification" means the record has an owner, and the owner is enforced by the contract rather than by a login screen.

Grant and revoke are a list, not a toggle. The underlying contract call silently does nothing if the wallet is already in or already out — so the interface shows you the current authorised set and you add to or remove from it.
Contract level
Who may create new certificates under this programme at all. Your issuing site, your subcontractor — or nobody but you.
Item level
Who may modify one specific certificate. Hand the MRO authority over serial 000417 when the part ships to them, and revoke it when it comes back. The other 999 records are untouched.
Correction, not erasure
Certificates can be updated. The previous state stays on-chain — a correction is a new transaction, so the history of what was claimed and when remains readable.
TRANSPARIUM/HOW TO USEACCESS CONTROL
SECTION 04

A production lot of 1,000 screws

One specification, a thousand parts, and the arithmetic shown rather than asserted.

Worked example · the unit of provenance

The lot is the unit. Not the screw.

You could give every screw its own passport. You should not, and the reason is not cost.

Because the industry already works this way
ATA Spec 2000 Chapter 16 mandates one eForm per part number for non-serialised parts, and one per serial number only for serialised ones. Its own worked example shows an EASA Form 1 with QTY=4 against a single lot number and no serials at all. Fastener traceability runs to the material heat, not to the item.
And because the standard permits it
EN 18219 defines passport identity at model, batch or item granularity. Batch is not a compromise — it is one of the three specified levels.
The real constraint on per-item
Item-level identity you cannot physically read back is worse than no claim at all. A screw head has no room for a Data Matrix carrying a URL. Per-item only makes sense where the carrier and the capture process genuinely exist.
Where per-item does apply: life-limited and serialised hardware, and any lot a customer contractually requires to be broken down. The platform issues either, and the choice is per programme.

Note for standard parts: a fastener designated a standard part under EASA 21.A.307(b)(1) needs no Form 1 at all — a dated delivery note naming the part and traceable to the manufacturer suffices. A passport is an addition to that regime, not a substitute for it.

TRANSPARIUM/WORKED EXAMPLEGRANULARITY

Worked example · the shape

Anchored once, referenced by everything

1,000 ITEMS · ONE CERTIFICATE EACH HST12-8-6/000001 sha256:9f2c… HST12-8-6/000002 sha256:9f2c… HST12-8-6/000003 sha256:9f2c… ⋮ 996 more HST12-8-6/001000 sha256:9f2c… ANCHORED ONCE · SHARED BY ALL 1,000 Technical specification sha256:9f2c4a…e71b Written to contract storage. One byte changes and the hash stops matching. The document is anchored once, not a thousand times — adding the 1,001st screw re-anchors nothing. Each certificate is independent: a screw can be updated or re-owned without touching the other 999. The specification is identified by its own content, so a revised sheet is a new hash, not an overwrite.
TRANSPARIUM/WORKED EXAMPLE1,000 : 1

Worked example · the arithmetic

What it actually costs, split honestly

Two things get conflated in every blockchain pitch. Separated here: what the network charges, and what we charge.

OperationWhat goes on-chainNetwork costCharged as
Deploy the programme contract Contract bytecode — once per programme cents One-off setup
Anchor the specification A 32-byte SHA-256 hash, in contract storage ~$0.05 Per document
Issue the lot passport Lot identity, material heat, release reference ~$0.05 Per lot
Optional: 1,000 item records One commitment covering the whole batch ~$0.05 total No incremental charge
Network cost for the entire lot Four writes, permanent, publicly verifiable under $0.25 —
The protocol fact
A hash anchor is a fixed 32 bytes — the same cost for a 10 KB certificate as for a 10 GB CAD package. On-chain cost does not vary with file size. Anyone can check that with a block explorer.
The commercial price
A one-time fee per document covers the transaction, the gas-price risk we absorb, verified issuer identity and durable retention. That is a service price, not a network cost — never "what the blockchain charges".

Basis: ~47,300 gas/anchor; mainnet base fee 0.118 gwei at block 25,789,431, 19 Aug 2026; ETH ≈ $1,935. Re-date before every presentation.

TRANSPARIUM/WORKED EXAMPLECOST · 19 AUG 2026

Worked example · the payoff

What changes at receiving inspection

Today
A box of fasteners arrives with a certificate. To verify it, the inspector would have to identify the issuing organisation, find a contact, send an email and wait — for a part worth a few pounds.

So nobody does it. The check happens after an engineer notices something wrong, which in the AOG case took four years.
With a passport on the lot
The inspector scans the label. The page loads the record from the chain, shows the verified legal name of the issuing organisation, and shows the specification hash.

No account, no portal, no trading relationship, no waiting. The check costs a few seconds, so it can be done on every receipt rather than on suspicion.
The fraud was not possible because verification was impossible. It was possible because verification was expensive enough that nobody bothered.
TRANSPARIUM/WORKED EXAMPLEAT RECEIVING
SECTION 05

What this does not do

The four objections worth raising before someone in the room raises them.

Limits · 01

A hash proves integrity. It does not prove availability.

If the document body is deleted, the on-chain hash still proves that a file with that exact content existed at that time — and nothing more. It will not give you the file back.

What this means for you
Your continuing-airworthiness retention obligation is on the record itself, not on a commitment to it. Anchoring supplements a records regime; it does not replace one.
What we do about it
The content store is addressed by hash, so a document is trivially re-verifiable from any copy — yours, ours, or your customer's. Keep your own copy. If it hashes to the value on chain, it is the authentic document, and it does not matter who handed it to you.
Say it this way: the chain removes the need to trust the custodian of a document. It does not remove the need for somebody to keep one.
TRANSPARIUM/LIMITSINTEGRITY ≠ AVAILABILITY

Limits · 02

Cheaper ways exist to store a file forever

Arweave will store a whole 10 MB document permanently for around twenty cents. If your question is purely "what is the cheapest permanent byte", we are not the answer, and pretending otherwise wastes your time.

Where raw storage wins
Cost per byte. Nothing else. A bare permanent-storage protocol gives you a file and a transaction id.
Where a passport platform wins
A verified issuer identity tied to a real legal entity · per-item authorisation so an MRO can update one record and not another · a public reader a mechanic can use without a wallet · EU data residency and a body you can delete when a customer demands erasure.
The honest framing: the storage is the cheap part. What costs money is the identity, the access control, the retention guarantee and the interface — and those are what make a passport count as evidence rather than as a file.
TRANSPARIUM/LIMITSVS. RAW STORAGE

Limits · 03

"Permanent" has to mean something specific

Three things on Ethereum are called permanent and only one of them is. This is the distinction that decides whether a record is still readable in 2050.

Where the data sitsRetentionActually permanent?We use it for
Contract storage variable In the state trie every node must carry to validate the next block Yes Issuer identity, and the records that must last
Event log In transaction receipts — within the scope of Ethereum's history-expiry work Committed, but retrieval not guaranteed Cheaper high-volume writes
Blob (EIP-4844) 4,096 epochs = 18.2 days No — pruned Nothing. Deliberately.

Why this is on a slide at all: blobs are the cheapest way to put bytes on Ethereum, and every cost-driven design lands on them. Any vendor quoting you a very low per-megabyte on-chain price should be asked how long the data survives. If the answer is a blob, it is eighteen days.

TRANSPARIUM/LIMITSDEFINING PERMANENCE

Limits · 04

We are not first, and the field has a failure record

Blockchain-anchored product passports are established practice in other sectors. Claiming to have invented the category would be checkable in about thirty seconds.

Already shipping, elsewhere
Aura Blockchain Consortium (LVMH, Prada, Cartier) — past 50 million products logged since 2021 · Arianee — millions of passports issued · Circularise — textiles and polymers · Spherity / Minespider on Catena-X for batteries.

The EU's own Blockchain Observatory published Digital Product Passport, a Blockchain-based Perspective in May 2024.
And in our sector, the record is worse
Honeywell's GoDirect Trade parts marketplace now redirects to Honeywell's main site. SITA's MRO Blockchain Alliance, formed 2020, was still using "pilot and validate" language three years later with no published deployment metrics. Aeron raised $5.7m of a $30m target in 2017 and its token fell below issue price.
So the narrow claim we will defend
The mechanism is proven and the regulator has already looked at it — EASA's VIRTUA project with IATA, SkyThread and PwC France assessed blockchain for approved parts management, completing in 2024. What does not exist is a productised, standards-conformant passport for the parts release chain, in production today. That is the gap, and it is a narrower claim than "first".
TRANSPARIUM/LIMITSPOSITIONING

Limits · 05

The objection that actually kills deals

Aerospace part data is export-controlled, design-approval-holder proprietary, and contractually restricted. "Put it on a public chain" is, correctly, the first thing your legal team will refuse.

Which is why the architecture puts almost nothing there
What goes on-chain is a hash and an identity. The specification, the Form 1 PDF, the material certificates — all of it stays in a store you control access to, in an EU region, deletable on request. The chain proves the document has not changed. It does not publish it.
EN 18239 — access rights management, information security, business confidentiality — exists precisely because this is the contested part of DPP. It is one of the six standards cited in the Official Journal.
Bring your export-control officer to the pilot scoping. Dual-use classification under EU 2021/821 and ITAR obligations shape what may appear even in a hash's surrounding metadata. That is a first-meeting conversation, not a later surprise.
TRANSPARIUM/LIMITSCONFIDENTIALITY

Where this goes

What a pilot looks like

WEEK 1–2
Pick one part programme
One family where you already hold lot traceability and a stable specification. Not your hardest case — your cleanest one.
WEEK 2–3
Issuer verification
The offline identity checks that put your legal name on-chain. This is the long pole and it starts first.
WEEK 3–5
Anchor and issue
The specification anchored, lot passports issued, carriers generated for your existing marking or labelling process.
WEEK 5–8
Put it in front of a customer
A receiving inspector at one MRO scanning real lots. The only test that matters is whether the check gets performed.
What we need from you
One part programme, one quality contact, one willing customer, and your export-control officer in the first scoping call.
What you get out of it
A working answer to "prove this lot came from you" — and a tested position for when your steel and aluminium suppliers start sending passports at you.
TRANSPARIUM/NEXTPILOT SHAPE
Transparium

Every part carries its own proof

The gap

Commodity hardware — the parts nobody serialises — is where the documentation fraud actually happened.

The mechanism

A verified issuer, a content hash, and a public reader that answers in a scan rather than an email thread.

The ask

One part programme, eight weeks, and one customer willing to scan a label at receiving.

app.transparium.com  ·  All figures dated August 2026 and sourced in the speaker notes  ·  S speaker view  ·  ? shortcuts